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Ulrich Friedrich Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop (30 April 1893 – 16 October 1946) was Foreign Minister of Germany from 1938 until 1945. He was later hanged for war crimes after the Nuremberg Trials.

Early life

Ribbentrop was born in Wesel, Rhenish Prussia, the son of Richard Ulrich Friedrich Joachim Ribbentrop, a career army oficer, and his wife Johanne Sophie Hertwig. Ribbentrop was educated irregularly at private schools in Germany and Switzerland. His father was cashiered from the Imperial German Army in 1908, following a series of disparaging remarks he had made about the alleged homosexuality of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and the Ribbentrop family were often short of money. Fluent in both French and English, Ribbentrop lived at various times in Grenoble, France, and London, before traveling to Canada in 1910. He worked for the Molsons Bank on Stanley Street in Montreal and then for the engineering firm M.P. and J.T. Davis on the reconstruction of the Quebec Bridge. He was also employed by the National Transcontinental Railway, which constructed a line from Moncton to Winnipeg. He worked as a journalist in New York City and Boston and then rested to recover tuberculosis in Germany. He returned to Canada and set up a small business in Ottawa importing German wine and champagne. In 1914, he competed for Ottawa's famous Minto ice-skating team, participating in the Ellis Memorial Trophy tournament in Boston in February.

When World War I began, Ribbentrop left Canada. He sailed from Hoboken, New Jersey on 15 August 1914 on the Holland-America ship The Potsdam, bound for Rotterdam. he then returned home and enlisted in the 125th Hussar Regiment.

He served first on the Eastern Front, but was later transferred to the Western Front. He earned by a commission and was awarded the Iron Cross. In 1918 1st Lieutenant Ribbentrop was stationed in Istanbul as a staff officer. During his time in Turkey, he became friends with another staff officer named Franz von Papen.

Family

In 1919 Ribbentrop met Anna Elisabeth Henkell, known as Annelies to her friends, daughter of a wealthy champagne producer from Wiesbaden. They married on 5 July 1920, and Ribbentrop travelled across Europe as a wine salesman. He and his wife would have five children:

• Rudolf von Ribbentrop (born 11 May 1921, in Wiesbaden), married in 1960 Ilse-Marie Freiin von Münchhausen (1914–2010)
• Bettina von Ribbentrop (born 20 July 1922, in Berlin)
• Ursula von Ribbentrop (born 29 December 1932, in Berlin)
• Adolf von Ribbentrop (born 2 September 1935, in Berlin), married first to Marion von Strempel and later to Maria de Mercedes Christiane Josefine Thekla Walpurga Barbara Gräfin und Edle Herrin von und zu Eltz genannt Faust von Stromberg (born 27 November 1951 at Eltville), and had two sons from each marriage:
  • Joachim von Ribbentrop (born 5 July 1963)
  • Dominik von Ribbentrop (born 25 September 1965)
  • Rudolf von Ribbentrop (born 5 July 1989 in Frankfurt-am-Main)
  • Friedrich von Ribbentrop (born 28 June 1990 in Frankfurt-am-Main)
• Barthold Henkell von Ribbentrop (born 19 December 1940, in Berlin), married to Brigitte von Trotha, the parents of:
  • Sebastian von Ribbentrop (born 3 February 1971), married on 12 May 2001 at Fuschl to Elisabethe/Isabelle Freiin Schuler von Senden (born 6 July 1975 in Munich).

Annelies von Ribbentrop was often described as being a Lady Macbeth-type who dominated her husband. Ribbentrop persuaded his aunt Gertrud von Ribbentrop to adopt him on 15 May 1925, which allowed him to add the aristocratic von to his name. During the Weimar Republic era, Ribbentrop was apolitical and displayed no anti-Semitic prejudices. As a wealthy partner in the Henckel-Trocken champagne firm, Ribbentrop did business with Jewish bankers, and organized the Impegroma Importing Company ("Import und Export großer Marken") with Jewish financing.

Early Nazi career

In 1928, Ribbentrop was introduced to Hitler, a man who "gets the same price for German champagne as others get for French champagne" as well as a businessman with foreign connections. He joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party on 1 May 1932 at the urging of his wife who herself joined the NSDAP at the same time. In January 1933, there was a complex set of intrigues which saw Franz von Papen and various friends of the President Paul von Hindenburg negotiating with Hitler to oust the Chancellor, General Kurt von Schleicher.

The end result of these talks was the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on 30 January 1933. Ribbentrop, who was both a Nazi Party member and an old friend of von Papen, facilitated the negotiations by arranging for von Papen and Hitler to meet secretly at his house in Berlin. This assistance endeared Ribbentrop to Hitler. Because Ribbentrop was a latecomer to the Nazi Party, the Alte Kämpfer (Old Fighters) of the party disliked him. The British historian Laurence Rees described Ribbentrop as "...the Nazi almost all the other leading Nazis hated" Typical of this hatred for Ribbentrop was the diary entry of Joseph Goebbels: "Von Ribbentrop bought his name, he married his money, and he swindled his way into office". To compensate for this, Ribbentrop became a fanatical Nazi, almost to the point of becoming a caricature of a Nazi brought to life. In particular, Ribbentrop became a vociferous anti-Semite.

He became German dictator Adolf Hitler's favourite foreign policy adviser, partly by dint of his knowledge of the world outside Germany, but mostly by means of shameless flattery and sycophancy. The professional diplomats of the elite Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) told Hitler the truth about what was happening abroad in the early years of Nazi Germany; Ribbentrop told Hitler what he wanted Hitler to hear. One German diplomat Herbert Richter in an interview later recalled "Ribbentrop didn't understand anything about foreign policy. His sole wish was to please Hitler". In particular, Ribbentrop acquired the habit of listening carefully to what Hitler was saying, memorizing pet ideas of the Führer, and then later presenting Hitler's ideas as his own - a practice that much impressed Hitler as proving Ribbentrop was an ideal National Socialist diplomat. To assist with this, Ribbentrop always questioned those who had lunch with Hitler about what he had said, thereby allowing Ribbentrop at his next meeting with Hitler to present Hitler's ideas as his own. Ribbentrop quickly learned that Hitler always favored the most radical solution to any problem, and accordingly tended his advice in that direction. As one of Ribbentrop's aides, the SS man Reinhard Spitzy recalled:

"When Hitler said "Grey", Ribbentrop said "Black, black, black". He always said it three times more, and he was always more radical. I listened to what Hitler said one day when Ribbentrop wasn't present: "With Ribbentrop it is so easy, he is always so radical. Meanwhile, all the other people I have, they come here, they have problems, they are afraid, they think we should take care and then I have to blow them up, to get strong. And Ribbentrop was blowing up the whole day and I had to do nothing. I had a break - much better!"

Ribbentrop in turn was a great admirer of Hitler. Ribbentrop was emotionally dependent on Hitler's favor to the extent that he suffered from psychosomatic illnesses if Hitler was unhappy with him. In 1933 he was given the title of SS-Standartenführer. For a time, Ribbentrop was friendly with the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, but ultimately the two became enemies mostly because the SS insisted upon the right to conduct its own foreign policy independent of Ribbentrop.

Ambassador to Britain

In August 1936, the German government appointed Ribbentrop Ambassador to Britain with orders to negotiate the Anglo-German alliance that Hitler had predicted in Mein Kampf. Ribbentrop arrived to take up his position in October 1936. The two month delay between Ribbentrop's appointment and his arrival in London was due to the fracas caused by the death of the Auswärtiges Amt's State Secretary Prince von Bülow in July 1936. Ribbentrop immediately suggested to Hitler that he succeed Bülow as State Secretary. Neurath informed Hitler that he would rather resign than have Ribbentrop as State Secretary and proceeded to appoint his son-in-law Hans Georg von Mackensen to that office. Hitler, for his part, had been highly impressed by Neurath's skillful efforts at defusing the crisis caused by remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936, and moreover felt that Ribbentrop's talents better suited him to serving as Ambassador than as State Secretary. Ribbentrop, who would have much preferred to be State Secretary than Ambassador, spent the next two months attempting to persuade Hitler to give him the former office rather than the latter before reluctantly leaving for Britain in October 1936.

The vain, arrogant, and tactless Ribbentrop was not the man for such a mission, but it is doubtful that even a more skilled diplomat could have fulfilled Hitler's dream of a grand Anglo-German alliance His time in London was marked by an endless series of social gaffes and blunders that worsened his already poor relations with the British Foreign Office (Punch referred to him as Von Brickendrop and the Wandering Aryan due to his frequent trips back to Germany.)

Ribbentrop did not understand the King's limited role in government as he thought King Edward VIII could decide British foreign policy. He convinced Hitler that he had Edward's support; but this, like his belief that he had impressed British society, was a tragic delusion. Ribbentrop often woefully misuderstood both British politics and society. During the abdication crisis of December 1936, Ribbentrop reported to Berlin that the reason the crisis had occurred was an anti-German Jewish-Masonic-reactionary conspiracy to depose Edward (whom Ribbentrop represented as a staunch friend of Germany), and that civil war would soon break out in Britain between supporters of the King and supporters of the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin. Ribbentrop's statements about the abdication crisis causing a civil war were greeted with much incredulity by those British people whom heard them. This led to a false sense of confidence about British intentions with which he unwittingly deceived his Führer.

In his dealings with the British government, most of Ribbentrop's time was spent either demanding that Britain sign the Anti-Comintern Pact or that London return the former German colonies in Africa. Other than his fruitless meetings with the British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden, who always refused on behalf of his government Ribbentrop's demands about the former colonies or the Anti-Comintern Pact, Ribbentrop spent most of his time as Ambassador courting what Ribbentrop called the “men of influence” as the best way of bringing about an Anglo-German alliance. Ribbentrop had developed the notion that the British aristocracy comprised some sort of secret society that ruled from behind the scenes, and if he could befriend enough members of Britain's “secret government”, then he could bring about an alliance with his country. Almost all of the initially favorable reports Ribbentrop provided to Berlin about the prospects of an Anglo-German alliance were based on friendly remarks about the “New Germany” from various British aristocrats like Lord Londonderry; the rather cool reception that Ribbentrop received from British Cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats did not make much of an impression on him at first.

In November 1937, Ribbentrop was placed in a highly embarrassing situation when his forceful advocacy of the return of the former German colonies led to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and the French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos offering to open talks on returning the former German colonies, in return for which the Germans would make binding commitments to respect their borders in Central and Eastern Europe. Since Hitler was not really interested in obtaining the former colonies, especially if the price was a brake on expansion into Eastern Europe, Ribbentrop was forced to turn down the Anglo-French offer that he had largely brought about. Immediately after turning down the Anglo-French offer on colonial restoration, Ribbentrop for reasons of pure malice ordered the Reichskolonialbund to increase the agitation for the former German colonies, a move which exasperated both the Foreign Office and Quai d'Orsay.

Ribbentrop's inability to achieve the alliance that he had been sent out for frustrated him, as he feared it could cost him Hitler's favour, and it made him a bitter Anglophobe. As the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano noted in his diary in late 1937, Ribbentrop had come to hate Britain with all the “fury of a woman scorned”. Ribbentrop, and Hitler for that matter, never understood that British foreign policy aimed at the appeasement of Germany, not an alliance.

Foreign Minister of the Reich

Appointment

On 4 February 1938, Ribbentrop succeeded Baron Konstantin von Neurath as Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop's appointment was generally taken at the time and since as indicating that German foreign policy was moving in a more radical direction. In contrast to Neurath's less bellicose and cautious nature, Ribbentrop unequivocally supported war in 1938-39. In May 1938 Benito Mussolini commented, "Ribbentrop belongs to the category of Germans who are a disaster for their country. He talks about making war right and left, without naming an enemy or defining an objective". Under Ribbentrop's influence, Hitler grew increasingly anti-British, through he never fully embraced Ribbentrop's anti-British foreign policy programme, which as the German historian Andreas Hillgruber noted was the "very opposite" of Hitler's foreign programme which saw an anti-Soviet alliance with Britain as the best course.

Ribbentrop's time as Foreign Minister can be divided into three periods. In the first, from 1938–39, he tried to persuade other states to align themselves with Germany for the coming war. In the second from 1939–43, Ribbentrop attempted to persuade other states to enter the war on Germany's side or at least maintain pro-German neutrality. In the final phase from 1943–45, he had the task of trying to keep Germany's allies from leaving her side. During the course of all three periods, Ribbentrop met frequently with leaders and diplomats from Italy, Japan, Romania, Spain, Bulgaria, and Hungary. During all this time, Ribbentrop feuded with various other Nazi leaders; at one point in August 1939 an armed clash took place between supporters of Ribbentrop and those of Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels over the control of a radio station in Berlin that was meant to broadcast German propaganda abroad (Goebbels claimed exclusive control of all propaganda both at home and abroad whereas Ribbentrop asserted a claim to monopolize all German propaganda abroad).

Views

As Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop was noted for his virulent Anglophobia and anti-Semitism. Although he was almost lackey-like in Hitler's presence, he could be boorish when he was alone. At a meeting between Ribbentrop, Hitler and Henderson on 3 March 1938 during which Henderson offered on behalf of his government a proposal for an international consortium to rule much of Africa, in which Germany would play a leading role in exchange for which Germany would agree not to change its borders through violence, the British offer was flatly refused by Hitler, who had no real interest in colonies in Africa, and was more interested in the idea of Lebensraum or expansionism, in Eastern Europe. At the same meeting, Ribbentrop stated that the British government secretly controlled the British press, and hence could silence at any moment all press criticism of the Nazi regime; the fact that the British government had not done so was proof of British malevolence towards Germany.

Pact with the Soviet Union and the outbreak of World War II

Ribbentrop played a key role in the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, and in the diplomatic action surrounding the attack on Poland. In public, Ribbentrop expressed great fury at the Polish refusal to allow for Danzig's return to the Reich or Polish permission for the “extra-territorial” highways, but since these matters were only intended after March 1939 to be a pretext for German aggression, Ribbentrop always refused in private to allow for any talks between German and Polish diplomats about these matters. It was Ribbentrop's fear that if German-Polish talks did take place, there was the danger that the Poles would agree to the German demands, and thereby deprive the Germans of their excuse for aggression. To further block German-Polish diplomatic talks, Ribbentrop had the German Ambassador to Poland Count Hans-Adolf von Moltke recalled, and refused to see the Polish Ambassador Józef Lipski. Throughout 1939, in private Hitler always described Britain as his main opponent, and portrayed the coming destruction of Poland as a necessary prelude towards the goal of destroying Britain. A notable contradiction existed in Hitler’s strategic planning between embarking on an anti-British foreign policy, whose major instruments consisted of a vastly expanded Kriegsmarine and a Luftwaffe capable of a strategic bombing offensive that would take several years to build (e.g. Plan Z for expanding the Kriegsmarine was a five year plan), and engaging in reckless short-term actions such as attacking Poland that were likely to cause a general war. Ribbentrop, for his part, because of his status as the Nazi British expert, resolved Hitler’s dilemma by supporting the anti-British line and by repeatedly advising Hitler that Britain would not go to war for Poland in 1939. Ribbentrop informed Hitler that any war with Poland would last for only 24 hours, and that the British would be so stunned with this display of German power that they would not honor their commitments. Ribbentrop supported his analysis of the situation by only showing Hitler diplomatic dispatches that supported his view that neither Britain or France would honor their commitments to Poland. In this, Ribbentrop was particularly supported by the German Ambassador in London, Herbert von Dirksen who reported that Chamberlain knew “the social structure of Britain, even the conception of the British Empire, would not survive the chaos of even a victorious war”, and so would back down over Poland. Furthermore, Ribbentrop had the German Embassy in London provide translations from pro-appeasement newspapers like the Daily Mail and the Daily Express for Hitler's benefit, which had the effect of making it seem that British public opinion was more strongly against going to war for Poland then was actually the case. The British historian Victor Rothwell wrote that the newspapers such as the Daily Express and the Daily Mail that Ribbentrop used to provide his press summaries for Hitler were out of touch not only with British public opinion, but also British government policy in regards to Poland. During the summer of 1939, Ribbentrop sabotaged all efforts at a peaceful solution to the Danzig dispute, leading the American historian Gerhard Weinberg to comment that “perhaps Chamberlain’s haggard appearance did him more credit than Ribbentrop’s beaming smile” as the countdown to a war that would kill millions inexorably gathered pace.

Relations with wartime allies

After June 1940, Ribbentrop, who was a Francophile, argued that Germany should allow Vichy France a limited degree of independence within a binding new Franco-German partnership. To this end, Ribbentrop appointed a colleague from the Dienststelle named Otto Abetz as Ambassador to France with instructions to promote the political career of Pierre Laval, whom Ribbentrop had decided was the French politican most favorable to Germany. The amount of Auswärtiges Amt influence in France varied as there were many other agencies competing for power there such as the military, the SS and the Four Year Plan office of Ribbentrop's archenemy Hermann Göring, but in general from late 1943 to mid-1944, the Auswärtiges Amt was second only to the SS in terms of power in France.

From the later half of 1937, Ribbentrop had championed the idea of an alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan that would partition the British Empire between them. After signing the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, Ribbentrop expanded on this idea for an Axis alliance to include the Soviet Union to form an Eurasian bloc that would destroy maritime states such as Britain. The German historian Klaus Hildebrand argued that besides Hitler’s foreign policy programme, there were three other factions within the Nazi Party who had alternative foreign policy programmes, whom Hildebrand dubbed the agrarians, the revolutionary socialists, and the Wilhelmine Imperialists. Another German diplomatic historian, Wolfgang Michalka argued that there was a fourth alternative Nazi foreign policy programme, and that was Ribbentrop’s concept of a Euro-Asiatic bloc comprising the four totalitarian states of Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy and Japan. Unlike the other factions, Ribbentrop’s foreign policy programme was the only one that Hitler allowed to be executed during the years 1939-41, though was more due to temporary bankruptcy of Hitler’s own foreign policy programme that he had laid in Mein Kampf and Zweites Buch following the failure to achieve the British alliance, than to a genuine change of mind. Ribbentrop's foreign policy conceptions differed from Hitler's in that Ribbentrop's concept of international relations owed more to the traditional Wilhelmine Machtpolitik than to Hitler's racist and Social Darwinist vision of different "races" locked in a merciless and endless struggle over Lebensraum. The different foreign-policy conceptions held by Hitler and Ribbentrop were illustrated in their reaction to the Fall of Singapore in 1942: Ribbentrop wanted this great British defeat to be a day of celebration in Germany, whereas Hitler forbade any celebrations on the grounds that Singapore represented a sad day for the principles of white supremacy. Another area of difference was that Ribbentrop had an obsessive hatred for Britain — which he saw as the main enemy — and the Soviet Union as important ally in the anti-British struggle; whereas Hitler saw the alliance with the Soviet Union as only tactical, and was nowhere as anti-British as his Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop liked and admired Stalin, and was against the attack on the USSR in 1941. He passed a word to a Soviet diplomat: "Please tell Stalin I was against this war, and that I know it will bring great misfortune to Germany."

Declining influence

As the war went on, Ribbentrop's influence declined. Since much of the world was at war with Germany, which was losing, the usefulness of the Foreign Ministry became increasingly limited. Hitler, for his part, found Ribbentrop increasingly tiresome, and sought to avoid him. The Foreign Minister's ever more desperate pleas for Hitler to allow him to find some way of making peace with at least some of Germany's enemies — the Soviet Union in particular — certainly played a role in this estrangement. In September 1943, the German Embassy in Stockholm came into contact with a NKVD agent who offered on behalf of the Soviet Union to start German-Soviet peace talks. Ribbentrop very much favored taking up the Soviet peace feeler, only to be overruled by Hitler, who had no interest in the Soviet peace offer. As Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler went into a sharp decline after 1943, he increasingly spent his time feuding with other Nazi leaders over control of anti-Semitic policies as a way of trying to win back Hitler's favor. In December 1943, Ribbentrop played a key role in having the radical French fascists installed into key positions in the Vichy cabinet. Ribbentrop had Joseph Darnand appointed as Interior Minister, Marcel Déat as Labour Minister and Philippe Henriot as Information Minister. One of Ribbentrop's last significant acts in the field of foreign relations was his role in the Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement with Finnish President Risto Ryti.

In the spring of 1944, the German Reich Plenipotentiary for Hungary, Edmund Veesenmayer of the Auswärtiges Amt played a major role in helping to arrange the deportation of 400,000 Hungarian Jews to the death camps. Veesenmayer kept Ribbentrop fully informed about the Hungarian deportations, sending the Foreign Minister weekly reports about the deportations, and threatened the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, when he ordered a halt to the deportations in July 1944. On 28 April 1944, Ribbentrop, who had finally won control of foreign propaganda, founded a new section at the Auswärtiges Amt called "Anti-Jewish Action Abroad" under Rudolf Schleier, which included Mohammad Amin al-Husayni and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani as members, and was given the responsibility of conducting anti-Semitic propaganda abroad.

A major blow against Ribbentrop was the participation of many old diplomats from the Auswärtige Amt in the 20 July 1944 putsch and assassination attempt against Hitler. Ribbentrop had no knowledge of the plot, but the involvement of so many former and serving members of the Foreign Ministry reflected badly on him. Hitler felt with some justification that Ribbentrop was not keeping proper tabs on what his diplomats were up to, because of his "bloated administration". After 20 July, Ribbentrop worked closely with the SS, with whom by this time he was reconciled, in purging the Auswärtige Amt of those suspected of involvement with the putsch. Two of the more notable diplomats to be executed after the July putsch were Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg and Ulrich von Hassell. As part of the purge effort, and at the instigation of his wife, Ribbentrop had Lieny Behlau, the widow of Frau Ribbentrop's younger brother, sent to a concentration camp in August 1944 under the Sippenhaft law, and the custody of her two children assigned to himself and his wife, which had the benefit of making the Ribbentrops the legal guardians of Behlau's share of the Henkell family fortune. Ribbentrop worked in close co-operation with the SS for what turned out to be his last significant foreign policy move, Operation Panzerfaust, the coup that deposed Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Regent of Hungary, on 15 October 1944. Horthy was deposed because he attempted to seek a separate peace with the Allies, and was replaced with Ferenc Szálasi, who resumed the deportation of Hungarian Jews in co-operation with the SS and the Auswärtige Amt that Horthy had halted in July 1944.

On 20 April 1945, Ribbentrop attended Hitler's 56th birthday party in Berlin. This was one of the last times he saw Hitler. On 23 April 1945, Ribbentrop attempted to have a meeting with Hitler, only to be told to go away, as Hitler had more important things to do than talk to him. This was his last meeting with Hitler.

On 14 June 1945, Ribbentrop was arrested by Sergeant Jacques Goffinet, a French citizen who had joined the Belgian SAS and was working with British forces near Hamburg. Found with him was a rambling letter addressed to the British Prime Minister "Vincent Churchill" criticizing British foreign policy for anti-German bias, blaming the British for the Soviet occupation of the eastern half of Germany, and thus for the advance of "Bolshevism" into central Europe. The fact that Ribbentrop even in 1945 did not record that Churchill's first name was "Winston" reflected either his general ignorance about the world outside of Germany, or else a distracted state of mind at the time of writing the letter.

Trial and execution

Ribbentrop was a defendant at the Nuremberg Trials, charged with crimes against peace, deliberately planning a war of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Prosecutors presented evidence that Ribbentrop was actively involved in the planning of German aggression and the deportation of Jews to death camps, as well as his advocacy of the killing of American and British airmen shot down over Germany.

The Allies' International Military Tribunal found him guilty of all charges brought against him. Even in prison, Ribbentrop remained subservient to Hitler, stating "Even with all I know, if in this cell Hitler should come to me and say 'Do this!', I would still do it."

While not recorded in the trial transcript, Hermann Göring was said to have remarked, after hearing these words, that Ribbentrop deserved to be hanged, even just for his stupidity.

At one point during the trial proceedings, U.S. Army interpreter for the prosecution Richard Sonnenfeldt asked Baron Ernst von Weizsacker, Ribbentrop's second in command, how Hitler could have made him a high official. Weizsacker responded "Hitler never noticed Ribbentrop's babbling because Hitler always did all the talking."

Since Göring had committed suicide a few hours prior to the time of execution, Ribbentrop was the first politician to be hanged on the morning of 16 October 1946. After being escorted up the 13 steps to the waiting noose, Ribbentrop was asked if he had any final words. He calmly said: "God protect Germany. God have mercy on my soul. My final wish is that Germany should recover her unity and that, for the sake of peace, there should be understanding between East and West." As the hood was placed over his head, Ribbentrop added: "I wish peace to the world." After a slight pause the executioner pulled the lever, releasing the trap door Ribbentrop stood upon. His neck snapped, he hung for 17 minutes before the doctor declared him dead.