
.
.HU JINTAO
Hu Jintao
(born 21 December 1942) is the current Paramount Leader of the
People's Republic of China. He has held the titles of General
Secretary of the Communist Party of China since 2002, President of
the People's Republic of China since 2003, and Chairman of the
Central Military Commission since 2004, succeeding
Jiang Zemin as the top leader of fourth generation leadership
of the People's Republic of China.
Hu possesses a low-key and
reserved leadership style. His rise to the presidency represents
China's transition of leadership from old, hard-core communists to
younger, more pragmatic technocrats. Since his ascendancy, Hu has
reinstated certain controls on the economy relaxed by the previous
administration, and has been highly conservative in his attitude
to political reforms. In foreign policy, Hu advocates for an
approach termed "China's peaceful development", pursuing soft
power in international relations. Through Hu's tenure, China's
global influence in Africa, Latin America, and other developing
countries has increased.
Hu has been involved in the
Communist party bureaucracy for most of his adult life, notably as
party chief for the Tibet Autonomous Region, and then later
Secretary of the Secretariat of CPC and Vice-President under Jiang
Zemin. Hu's political philosophy is summarily described as aiming
to found a basis for Harmonious Society domestically and for
Peaceful Development internationally, the former generated by
a Scientific Development Concept, which seeks integrated solutions
to tackle China's various economic, environmental and social
problems.
Early life
Hu Jintao was born in Jiangyan,
Jiangsu on 21 December 1942. His branch of the family migrated
from Jixi of Anhui to Jiangyan during his grandfather's
generation. Official records therefore describe him as a native of
Jixi without mention of Jiangsu.
Even though his father owned a
small tea trading business in Taizhou, the family was relatively
poor. His mother died when he was seven, and he was raised by an
aunt. Hu's father was later denounced during the Cultural
Revolution, an event that (together with his relatively humble
origins) apparently had a deep effect upon Hu, who diligently
tried to clear his father's name.
Hu was a gifted student in high
school, excelling in activities such as singing and dancing. In
1964, while still a student at Beijing's Tsinghua University, Hu
joined the Communist Party of China (CPC), before the Cultural
Revolution. He was the chairman of Tsinghua Student Union at that
time. He graduated in hydraulic engineering in 1965. At Tsinghua,
Hu met a fellow student Liu Yongqing, now his wife. They have a
son and a daughter named Hu Haifeng and Hu Haiqing respectively.
In 1968, Hu volunteered for his
service in Gansu and worked on the construction of Liujiaxia
Hydro-power Station while also managing Party affairs for the
local branch of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric
Power. From 1969 to 1974, Hu worked for Sinohydro Engineering
Bureau, as an engineer.
Early
political career
In 1974, Hu was transferred to the Construction Department of
Gansu as a secretary. The next year he was promoted to vice senior
chief. In 1980,
Deng Xiaoping implemented the "Four Transformations" program,
which aimed to produce communist leaders who were "more
revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable, and more specialized."
In response to this nation-wide search for young party members,
Song Ping, the first secretary of CPC Gansu Committee (Gansu's
governor) discovered Hu Jintao and promoted him several ranks to
the position of deputy head of the commission.
Another protégé of Song,
Wen Jiabao, also became prominent at the same time.
In 1981, Hu, along with Deng
Xiaoping's daughter Deng Nan and Hu Yaobang's son Hu Deping, were
trained in the Central Party School in Beijing. Hu made a good impression on
Deng Nan, who happened to report it to her father. Hu Deping even invited Hu Jintao to his home
and met with Hu Yaobang, who was a standing member of the
politburo at that time. Hu Jintao's modesty created an impact on
Hu Yaobang.
In 1982, Hu was promoted to the position of Communist Youth
League Gansu Branch Secretary and was appointed as the director of
the
All-China Youth Federation.
His mentor Song Ping was transferred to Beijing as Minister of
Organization of the Communist Party of China, and was in charge of
senior cadres' recommendation, candidacy and promotion. With the
support of Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping, Hu was assured of a
bright future in the party. At Song Ping's suggestion, in 1982
central Party authorities invited Hu to Beijing to study at the
Central Party School.
Soon after, he was transferred to Beijing and appointed as
secretariat of the
Communist Youth League Central Committee ("CY Central"). Two
years later Hu was promoted to First Secretary of CY Central, thus
its actual leader. During his term in the Youth League, Hu
escorted Hu Yaobang, who was General Secretary of CPC then, in
visits around the country. Hu Yaobang, himself a veteran coming
from the Youth League, could reminiscence his youth through Hu's
company.
Party Committee Secretary of Guizhou
In 1985, Hu Yaobang pushed for Hu
Jintao to be transferred to Guizhou as the provincial Committee
Secretary of Communist Party of China. Hu attempted to improve the
economy of the backwater province, and reputedly visited all of
its eighty-six counties. While in Guizhou, Hu was careful to
follow Beijing's directives and had a reputation of being
"airtight"; he rarely would offer his views on policy matters in
public. While Hu was generally seen as an official with integrity
and honesty, some locals preferred his predecessor Zhu Houze. In
1987, Hu Jintao handled the local students protest parallel to the
Democracy Wall carefully, whereas in Beijing similar protests
resulted in Hu Yaobang's forced resignation.
Tenure in Tibet
The exit of his patron Hu Yaobang from the political scene was
initially seen as unfavourable towards Hu Jintao. He drew
criticism from party elders for failing to criticize the ousted
reformer. In 1988, Hu was transferred to become Provincial
Committee Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the restive
area's number-one figure, while also taking on the role of
Political Commissar of the local People's Liberation Army units. A
number of Tibetans have long been opposed to government policy in
the region and unrest and ethnic conflict were brewing,
particularly anti-Han Chinese sentiments amongst local Tibetans.
Minor clashes had been occurring since 1987, and when the scale of
unrest grew, Hu responded with the deployment of some 1,700
People's Armed Police into Lhasa in February 1989 in an attempt to
warn against further disturbance. Increased clashes culminated in
serious rioting in Lhasa's core on March 5, 1989, five days before
the 30th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising. What occurred
after is a matter of dispute: rioters accused the police of
shooting them arbitrarily, and the police claiming that they had
acted in self-defense. In addition, there was speculation that Hu
delayed his orders to clamp down on the protesters until late into
the evening, when the police chief was forced to act because the
situation was spiraling out of control. The protesters were
suppressed early into the next day, and Hu asked Beijing to
declare martial law on March 8.
Hu's role in the demonstrations and rioting on March 5 was
never made clear. While it is general protocol that Hu must have
at least implicitly approved the use of force against protesters,
whether he actually gave orders throughout March 5 is a matter of
debate.
In addition, John Tkacik cites that Hu had been coordinating with
the
Chengdu Military Region for troops to be on full alert as the
situation progressed.
Some diplomatic analysts linked what they saw as Hu's brutal use
of force to the suppression of activists and students at in
Tiananmen Square, which took place a mere three months later.
Whether Hu provided "inspiration" for the PLA on June 4 is a
matter of debate, but it was clear that Hu's actions in Lhasa
earned him unprecedented attention in the upper echelons of party
power, including paramount leader
Deng Xiaoping. When tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square, Hu was
one of the first regional leaders to declare his support for the
central authorities.
Hu experienced high-altitude sickness in June 1990, and returned
to Beijing, but remained in his position for another two years,
during which Hu achieved little. But his departure to Beijing was
seen as a means to return to the centrefold of Chinese politics,
which led to some doubts as to whether or not he was as ill as he
had claimed.
Candidacy
Before the opening of the 14th
National Congress of the CPC in 1992, the Party's senior leaders,
including Deng and Chen Yun, were to select candidates for the
Politburo Standing Committee to ensure a smooth transition of
power from the so-called second-generation leaders (Deng, Chen, Li
Xiannian, Wang Zhen, etc.) to third-generation Communist Party of
China leaders (Jiang
Zemin,
Li
Peng, Qiao Shi etc.). Deng also proposed that they should consider
another candidate for a further future transition, preferably
someone under fifty to represent the next generation of leaders.
Song, as the organization chief, recommended Hu as an ideal
candidate for the prospect of a future leader. As a result,
shortly before his 50th birthday, Hu Jintao became the youngest
member of the seven-member
Politburo Standing Committee, and the second youngest
Politburo Standing Committee member ever since the CCP took power
in 1949.
In 1993, Hu took charge of the Secretariat of the
CPC Central Committee, which oversaw day-to-day operations of
the Central Committee, and the Central Party School, which was
convenient for him to bring up his own supporters among senior CPC
cadres. Hu was also put in charge of the ideological work of the
CPC. Although Hu was considered heir apparent to Jiang, he always
took great care to ensure that Jiang be at the center of the
spotlight. In late 1998, Hu promoted Jiang's unpopular movement of
the "Three Stresses" – "stress study, stress politics, and stress
healthy trends" – giving speeches to promote it. In 2001, he
publicized Jiang's
Three Represents theory, which Jiang hoped to place him on the
same level as other Marxist theoreticians.
As a result, he left the public with an impression of being
low-key, courteous, and adept at forming coalitions. In 1998, Hu became Vice-President of China,
and Jiang wanted Hu to play a more active role in foreign affairs.
Hu became China's leading voice during the
NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.
When the transition finally took place in the 16th National
Congress of the CPC in 2002, Jiang was reluctant to leave the
center of power. It was widely believed that he staffed the
Politburo with many members of the so-called "Shanghai Clique",
including Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju and Li
Changchun, which could ensure Jiang's control behind the stage. Jiang held on to the
position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Secretaryship and Presidency
Since taking over as Party General
Secretary at the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist
Party of China, Hu and his premier, Wen Jiabao, proposed to set up
a Harmonious Society which aims at lessening the inequality and
changing the style of the "GDP first and Welfare Second" policies.
They focused on sectors of the Chinese population that have been
left behind by the economic reform, and have taken a number of
high profile trips to the poorer areas of China with the stated
goal of understanding these areas better. Hu and Wen Jiabao have
also attempted to move China away from a policy of favouring
economic growth at all costs and toward a more balanced view of
growth that includes factors in social inequality and
environmental damage, including the use of the green gross
domestic product in personnel decisions. Jiang's
clique, however, maintained control in most developing areas,
therefore Hu and Wen's measures of macroeconomic regulation faced
great resistance.
SARS crisis
The first crisis of Hu's
leadership happened during the outbreak of SARS in 2003. Following
strong criticism of China for initially covering up and responding
slowly to the crisis, he dismissed several party and government
officials, including the health minister, who supported Jiang, and
the Mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, widely perceived as Hu's protégé. Meng's
dismissal was sometimes seen as a yielding compromise to erode
Jiang's support in the party. Hu and Wen took steps to increase the
transparency of China's reporting to international health
organizations, indirectly dealing a blow to Jiang's stance on the
issue at hand.
Succession of Jiang Zemin
On 15 November 2002, a new Hu Jintao-led Politburo nominally
succeeded Jiang. Although Jiang, then 76, stepped down from the
powerful General Secretary and the Politburo Standing Committee to
make way for a younger
fourth generation of leadership, there was speculation
that Jiang would retain significant influence because Hu was not
associated with Jiang's influential
Shanghai clique, to which six out of the nine members of
the all-powerful Standing Committee were believed to be linked.
However, later developments show that many of its members have
shifted their positions. Zeng Qinghong, for example, moved from a
disciple of Jiang to serving as an intermediary between the two
factions.
In 2003, Jiang was also re-elected to the post of Chairman of the
Central Military Commission of the CPC, a post from which
Deng Xiaoping was able to wield power from behind the scenes
as 'paramount leader', thus retaining military power.
Western observers attribute a sense of caution to Hu's
philosophies, citing China's recent history of fallen heirs. Deng
Xiaoping appointed three party General Secretaries, all designed
to be successors, and was instrumental in the ousting of two of
them,
Hu Yaobang and
Zhao Ziyang. His third and final selection, Jiang Zemin, won
Deng's continued, although ambiguous backing and was the only
General Secretary in Communist Chinese history to voluntarily
leave his post when his term ended.
Although many believe Hu was originally hand-picked by Deng as
the youngest member of China's top leadership and a leading
candidate to succeed Jiang, he had exercised a great deal of
political skills between 1992 and 2002 to consolidate his
position, and eventually emerged as Jiang's heir apparent in his
own right. Hu also benefited from the slow but progressive
institutionalization of power succession within the Party,
something his predecessors lacked entirely. Since the early 1980s,
the People's Republic of China has been marked by progressive
institutionalization and rule by consensus, and moved away from
the Maoist authoritarian model. Although a western-style legal
institution and rule of law remain to be put in place, Hu's power
succession was conducted in a fairly orderly and civil manner,
which was unprecedented in Communist China's history. This trend
is expected to continue and an institutionalized mechanism of
power transition is expected to emerge, first perhaps within the
Party. In fact, it has been one of the Party's stated major goals
to create an orderly system of succession and mechanism to prevent
informal rule and a
cult of personality.
The rivalry between Jiang and Hu
after Jiang stepped down from his posts was, arguably, an
inevitable product of China's tradition of succession. Some
analysts argue that although Jiang has consolidated power by the
time he retired, his ideological stature within the Communist
Party remains shaky at best, thus Jiang had to buy time to ensure
that his ideological legacy such as the Three Represents, is
enshrined in China's socialism doctrine. Jiang resigned as
Chairman of the Central Military Commission in September 2004, his
last official post. Whether this is the result of pressure from Hu
or a personal decision is up for speculation. Since then Hu has
officially taken on the three institutions in the People's
Republic of China where power lie, the party, the state, as well
as the military, thus informally, has become the paramount leader.
General Secretary Hu and Premier
Wen Jiabao inherited a China wrought with internal social,
political and environmental problems. One of the biggest
challenges Hu faces is the large wealth disparity between the
Chinese rich and poor, for which discontent and anger mounted to a
degree which wreaked havoc on communist rule. Furthermore, the
cronyism and corruption plaguing China's civil service, military,
educational, judicial and medical systems sought to destroy the
country bit by bit. In the beginning of 2006, however, Hu launched
the "8 Honours and 8 Disgraces" movement in a bid to promote a
more selfless and moral outlook amongst the population. China's
increasingly fragile environment has caused massive urban
pollution, sandstorms and the destruction of vast tracts of
habitable land. It remains to be seen if Hu, usually cautious in
nature, is capable of managing the continued peaceful development
of China while avoiding international incidents, at the same time
presiding over an unprecedented increase in Chinese nationalist
sentiment.
At the
11th National People's Congress, Hu was re-elected as
President on 15 March 2008. He was also re-elected as Chairman of
the Central Military Commission.
Newsweek named Hu the second most powerful person in the
world referring to him as "the man behind the wheel of the
world's most supercharged economy."
Forbes also named him the second most powerful person in
the world.
Hu has been listed four times (2008, 2007, 2005 & 2004) on the
Time 100 annual list of most influential people.
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